The Justice of Unequal Pay in the UFC:  An In-Depth Analysis of the Fighters’ Antitrust Class Action Lawsuit Against the UFC and the Misplaced Support of the Proposed Muhammad Ali Expansion Act by Sundberg, Hunter
Pace Intellectual Property, Sports & Entertainment Law Forum 
Volume 8 
Issue 1 Fall 2017 Article 1 
September 2017 
The Justice of Unequal Pay in the UFC: An In-Depth Analysis of 
the Fighters’ Antitrust Class Action Lawsuit Against the UFC and 
the Misplaced Support of the Proposed Muhammad Ali Expansion 
Act 
Hunter Sundberg 
Nova Southeastern University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pipself 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, 
and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hunter Sundberg, The Justice of Unequal Pay in the UFC: An In-Depth Analysis of the Fighters’ Antitrust 
Class Action Lawsuit Against the UFC and the Misplaced Support of the Proposed Muhammad Ali 
Expansion Act, 8 Pace. Intell. Prop. Sports & Ent. L.F. 1 (2017). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pipself/vol8/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Intellectual Property, Sports & Entertainment Law Forum by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
The Justice of Unequal Pay in the UFC: An In-Depth Analysis of the Fighters’ 
Antitrust Class Action Lawsuit Against the UFC and the Misplaced Support of the 
Proposed Muhammad Ali Expansion Act 
Abstract 
In 2016, the Ultimate Fighting Championships (“UFC”) set the record for the largest sale in sports history. 
The UFC, the primary promotion company of the once fringe sport of mixed martial arts (“MMA”) had 
matured into a mammoth 4 billion dollar promotion, but not without some growing pains. The league is 
replete with controversy, mostly dealing with disgruntled athletes over compensation. Athletes of the UFC 
feel that they are being financially exploited and they may be correct. The athletes are choosing different 
routes to remedy their pay disparities but they are misguided. 
The first course of action chosen by the fighters is litigation, as a group of former UFC fighters have filed a 
class action antitrust suit against the UFC. Fighters are also lobbying for legislation in an attempt to 
expand the Muhammad Ali Act to regulate MMA as another method of resolution. While both will 
ultimately fail to appease the aggrieved athletes, the process may injure the UFC brand, something 
fighters may want to avoid. By reviewing similar antitrust disputes in sports and entertainment, the failure 
of the lawsuit against the UFC becomes apparent. As for the legislation, the Muhammad Ali Act fell short 
in protecting fighters in boxing as it was intended and will have the same ineffectualness in MMA. When 
the UFC was purchased in 2016 by WME-IMG, an immense international entertainment conglomerate, it is 
not likely the company was ignorant to these unsettled issues. This leads to the conclusion that the 
league’s prospects are still bright. It is in the fighters’ and the league’s best interests to quell their innate 
divisive temperaments and negotiate a compromise internally. 
Part II of this paper discusses the history of MMA, the sport of mixed martial arts. It also evaluates the 
evolution and current state of the UFC, the premier league that arranges and promotes the competition of 
elite MMA athletes. After a brief explanation of relevant antitrust laws, Part III analyzes the merits of the 
class action lawsuit against the UFC. Part IV explores the distinct nature of MMA and why antitrust 
enforcement will have varying results from what the athletes hope to achieve. Part V addresses possible 
effects of the proposed federal legislation amending the Muhammad Ali Act. Finally, Part VI summarizes 
that the antitrust litigation and proposed regulation will fail to redress the fighters’ affliction of their 
income but may injure the UFC brand. Thus, imploring the league to be proactive in resolving this issue. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the Ultimate Fighting Championships (“UFC”) set the record for 
the largest sale in sports history.1 The UFC, the primary promotion company 
of the once fringe sport of mixed martial arts (“MMA”) had matured into a 
mammoth 4 billion dollar promotion2, but not without some growing pains.3 
The league is replete with controversy, mostly dealing with disgruntled 
athletes over compensation.4  Athletes of the UFC feel that they are being 
financially exploited and they may be correct.5 The athletes are choosing 
different routes to remedy their pay disparities but they are misguided.  
The first course of action chosen by the fighters is litigation, as a group 
of former UFC fighters have filed a class action antitrust suit against the 
UFC.6 Fighters are also lobbying for legislation in an attempt to expand the 
Muhammad Ali Act to regulate MMA as another method of resolution.7 
While both will ultimately fail to appease the aggrieved athletes, the process 
                                                 
1 See Cindy Boran, UFC Sale is Official at a Reported $4 Billion in One of the Biggest 
Sales in Sports History, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/07/11/ufcs-dana-white-
confirms-4-billion-sale-the-largest-in-sports-history/?utm_term=.caf3c8e9c6eb (In 2016, 
the UFC sold for a record $4 Billion, after grossing an estimated $600 million just the year 
before.  This marked one of the largest sales in sports history.  The sale provided a $3.9 
Billion cultivation over a short period since the UFC was purchased in 2000 for only $2 
million). 
2 Id. 
3 See generally Bill Reiter, UFC's Evolution Almost Complete, but Growing Pains Evident 
in Jon Jones Fiasco, CBS SPORTS (July 8, 2016), 
http://www.cbssports.com/mma/news/ufcs-evolution-almost-complete-but-growing-pains-
evident-in-jon-jones-fiasco/; see also Anton Tabuena, Several Fighters Outraged About 
CM Punk’s $500,000 Pay at UFC 203, SB NATION:  BLOODY ELBOW (Sept. 13, 2016, 8:00 
AM), http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2016/9/13/12900438/mma-fighters-outraged-about-
cm-punk-500000-pay-ufc-203. 
4 Tabuena, supra note 3; see also UFC’s Lorenzo Fertitta:  We Pay Fighters Way More 
Than Anybody Else (Video), MMA WEEKLY (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://www.mmaweekly.com/ufcs-lorenzo-fertitta-we-pay-fighters-way-more-than-
anybody-else-video; infra notes 5 & 8. 
5 See Brett Okamoto, Michael McDonald Saving Money from Second Job to Continue UFC 
Career, ESPN (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/18551901/ufc-
bantamweight-michael-mcdonald-career-remains-hold-mma; See also Jonathan Snowden, 
The Business of Fighting a Look Inside UFC’s Top-Secret Fighter Contract, THE 
BLEACHER REPORT (May. 14, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1516575-the-
business-of-fighting-a-look-inside-the-ufcs-top-secret-fighter-contract (No one said the life 
of a fighter would be easy, but as the UFC has established their legitimacy on the world 
stage, it is odd when athletes are not able to compete due to compensation inadequacies.  
This is an especially prevalent issue after the company sold for a record 4 billion dollars). 
6 Complaint, Le, v. Zuffa, LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d (D. Nev. 2016). 
7 Muhammad Ali Expansion Act, H.R. 5365, 114th Cong. (2016).  
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may injure the UFC brand, something fighters may want to avoid. By 
reviewing similar antitrust disputes in sports and entertainment, the failure of 
the lawsuit against the UFC becomes apparent. As for the legislation, the 
Muhammad Ali Act fell short in protecting fighters in boxing as it was 
intended and will have the same ineffectualness in MMA.8 When the UFC 
was purchased in 2016 by WME-IMG, an immense international 
entertainment conglomerate, it is not likely the company was ignorant to 
these unsettled issues. This leads to the conclusion that the league’s prospects 
are still bright.9 It is in the fighters’ and the league’s best interests to quell 
their innate divisive temperaments and negotiate a compromise internally. 
Part II of this paper discusses the history of MMA, the sport of mixed 
martial arts. It also evaluates the evolution and current state of the UFC, the 
premier league that arranges and promotes the competition of elite MMA 
athletes. After a brief explanation of relevant antitrust laws, Part III analyzes 
the merits of the class action lawsuit against the UFC. Part IV explores the 
distinct nature of MMA and why antitrust enforcement will have varying 
results from what the athletes hope to achieve. Part V addresses possible 
effects of the proposed federal legislation amending the Muhammad Ali Act. 
Finally, Part VI summarizes that the antitrust litigation and proposed 
regulation will fail to redress the fighters’ affliction of their income but may 
injure the UFC brand. Thus, imploring the league to be proactive in resolving 
this issue. 
II. BACKGROUND -- THE UFC’S ASCENT TO THE THRONE OF MMA 
PROMOTION 
There exists a common confusion between the difference of MMA and 
the UFC.  Simply put, MMA is to the UFC, what football is to the National 
Football League (“NFL”). In other words, MMA is the sport and the UFC is 
a league for the sport.10  
Although many people believe MMA is a relative newcomer, it actually 
can be traced back to the original Olympic games, and was popular until the 
                                                 
8See Jason Cruz, Is the Muhammad Ali Act Helping Protect Fighters?, THE WHITE BRONCO 
(May 2, 2016), http://thewhitebronco.com/2016/05/is-the-muhammad-ali-act-helping-
protect-fighters. (The proposed regulation did not adequately protect fighters in boxing and 
will produce similar frustrations for the athletes in MMA). 
9 Noah Kirsch, While Fighters Complain of Low Pay, UFC Sells Itself for $4 Billion, 
FORBES (July 15, 2016, 9:05 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/noahkirsch/2016/07/15/while-fighters-complain-of-low-pay-
ufc-sells-for-4-billion/#2fab96741bb2; see also Boran, supra note 1. 
10 Although the analogy is not perfect because the UFC is not the only league, it is the 
prominent league in the sport, where most of the talent and revenue of MMA can be found.   
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fall of the Roman Empire in the fourth century.11 It did not emerge in America 
until the early 1990’s.12  Even then, MMA only slightly resembled the sport 
as it exists today.13  The UFC at its outset, promoted itself as a rule-less, no 
holds-barred cage fight without any weight divisions.14 Due to public outcry, 
the UFC’s successes of promoting MMA in that fashion were short lived.15 
The sport quickly experienced widespread resistance from national and state 
legislatures, resulting in cumbersome regulation and in some states, a 
complete ban of the sport. 16 
In 2001, MMA made drastic progress driven by the successes of the UFC. 
The UFC was acquired by Zuffa, LLC, consisting of two Las Vegas casino 
moguls and their business partner Dana White.17  Also in 2001, the New 
Jersey Athletic Control Board adopted the Unified Rules of Mixed Martial 
Arts,18 which would be used to create uniform standards for competition 
nationwide.19  With new standards and strong management, the UFC made 
great strides, progressing the sport into the 21st century. 
After Zuffa purchased the UFC in 200120, the promotion company 
aggressively competed to rise to the top as the premiere MMA league. 
Ironically, many of the UFC’s actions that contributed to its dominance, are 
cited in the chief complaint against them, as anticompetitive conduct.21 Thus, 
it is important to see how the UFC became to dominate the promotion of 
MMA through acquisition of its numerous early competitors.  
In December 2006 the UFC began its incursion on competing leagues by 
purchasing World Extreme Fighting (“WEC”)22 and World Fighting Alliance 
                                                 
11 Jordan T. Smith, Fighting for Regulation:  Mixed Martial Arts Legislation in the United 
States, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 617, 620 (2010). 
12 Discover, THE UFC, http://www.ufc.com/discover/ufc (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
13 Id. 
14 Adam Hill, A Timeline of UFC Rules:  From No-Holds-Barred to Highly Regulated, 
BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 24, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1614213-a-timeline-
of-ufc-rules-from-no-holds-barred-to-highly-regulated. 
15 Dave Meltzer, A Look Back at the 1990s Hysteria Which Got MMA Banned in New York, 
MMA FIGHTING, (April 3, 2016, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.mmafighting.com/2016/4/3/11312322/new-york-was-both-the-first-and-last-
state-to-pass-a-law-legalizing. 
16 Jeffery B. Same, Breaking the Chokehold:  An Analysis of Potential Defenses Against 
Coercive Contracts in Mixed Martial Arts, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1063 (2012). 
17 See Smith, supra note 11. 
18 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:46-24 (2017). 
19 Hill, supra note 14. 
20 See THE UFC, supra note 12. 
21 Bill Viola Jr, Who Really Invented MMA Mixed Martial Arts, MMA HISTORY, (Nov. 7, 
2017), http://mmahistory.org/who-invented-mma/. 
22 Ken Pishna & Ivan Trembow, UFC Buying World Extreme Cagefighting, MMA 
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(“WFA”).23  Some of the WFA’s fighters were immediately brought into the 
UFC’s roster,24whereas the WEC, an established league that focused on 
lighter weight classes, continued to operate for some time separately.25 In 
2010, The WEC’s roster of fighters were either signed with the UFC or 
released.26  WEC fighters were mostly enamored at the idea of fighting for 
the UFC as their star champion, Uriah Faber was quoted, “I’ve always wanted 
this to happen because it felt like I was carrying the brunt of the weight for 
the WEC. So now there are new benefits and opportunities.”27   Undoubtedly 
the UFC’s motivation for the acquisition was self-profit, but fans were 
excited to see an improved product with more fights and greater 
competition.28 It would be important to note of the environment in which this 
acquisition occurred. It was not a situation where athletes and fans were 
unhappy to join the UFC, in fact it was quite the opposite. 
The UFC announced they had acquired Pride in 2006.29 In the early days 
of MMA, Pride, based in Japan, was the largest and most popular MMA 
promotion.30 It had since dwindled and the UFC sought to revamp the Pride 
                                                 
WEEKLY (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.mmaweekly.com/ufc-buying-world-extreme-
cagefighting-2.  
23 UFC Acquires World Fighting Alliance, Inc., MMAJUNKIE (Dec. 11, 2006, 10:05 PM), 
http://mmajunkie.com/2006/12/ufc-acquires-world-fighting-alliance-inc. 
24 Many fighters of WFA were brought into the UFC roster while others were released. See 
Ivan Trembow & Ken Pishna, UFC Buys Select Assets as WFA Ceases Operations, MMA 
WEEKLY, (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.mmaweekly.com/ufc-buys-select-assets-as-wfa-
ceases-operations-2. 
25 Ray Hui, The History of the WEC:  A Timeline, MMA FIGHTING (Oct. 28, 2010, 1:35 
PM), https://www.mmafighting.com/2010/10/28/the-history-of-the-wec-a-timeline. 
26 John Buhl, Report: Jamie Varner and Chris Horodecki Released by UFC, 
PROMMANOW (Dec. 28, 2010),  
 http://prommanow.com/2010/12/28/report-jamie-varner-and-chris-horodecki-released-by-
ufc/. 
27 Steve Barry, UFC & WEC to Merge in January 2011 (Update II:  Jose Aldo Defends 
Title at UFC 125), MMA CONVERT (Oct. 28, 2010), 
http://www.mmaconvert.com/2010/10/28/the-wec-will-merge-with-the-ufc-in-january-
2011/. 
28 Tim Burke, Analyzing the UFC/WEC Merger After Eight Months, Part One, SB NATION:  
BLOODY ELBOW (Aug 11, 2011, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2011/8/11/2356338/analyzing-the-ufc-wec-merger-after-
eight-months. 
29 Done deal:  UFC Owners Purchase Pride FC, SB NATION:  MMA MANIA, (Mar. 27, 
2007, 7:40 AM), https://www.mmamania.com/2007/03/27/done-deal-ufc-owners-purchase-
pride-fc . 
30 Rainer Lee, PRIDE Before the Fall:  A Look Back at Japan's Greatest MMA 
Organization, SB NATION:  BLOODY ELBOW, (Oct. 30, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2014/10/30/7101575/pride-before-the-fall-a-look-back-at-
japans-greatest-mma-organization. 
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league and ultimately have it compete with the UFC.31  Those aspirations 
may have existed but the rejuvenation of Pride never materialized and the 
league’s fighters, as occurred with the WEC’s and WFA’s fighters, were 
eventually merged into the UFC roster or released.32 
Strikeforce, another competitive league in the United States was 
purchased by the UFC in 2011.33  The league was to be operated separately 
as WEC did for the first few years post acquisition.34 Within three years, and 
after a few botched events, the league folded and its fighters were again 
absorbed into the UFC, most notably UFC superstar Ronda Rousey.35 Rhonda 
Rousey would grow to become one of the most accomplished fighters in the 
UFC and for a moment was referred to as “the world’s most dominant 
athlete.”36 
The common theme is apparent, the UFC buys out its competition.  
Although this not an inherently bad practice nor is it illegal, the fighters 
complain of the UFC’s actions were not innocent. The antitrust complaint 
alleges the league executed a strategy to control all available talent, sponsors, 
venues and broadcasting to weaken and then eliminate competing 
promotions, leaving it with a monopoly.37  The alternative view, of course, is 
that the UFC consolidated all the talent so that consumers could enjoy the 
most entertaining fights. Not surprising, fans recognize that the UFC simply 
produces the proverbial “better mousetrap,” resulting in the demise of its 
competitors and the league’s legal dominance.  
III. ANTITRUST: MERITS OF ANTITRUST SUITS AGAINST ZUFFA, DIFFERENT 
SPORTS ENTITIES, AND OTHER INDUSTRIES 
Competition is viewed as the driving force in creating superior products 
                                                 
31 The SuperBowl of MMA:  UFC vs. Pride Mega-Events, MMAJUNNKIE, (March 28, 2007, 
11:54 PM), http://mmajunkie.com/2007/03/the-superbowl-of-mma-ufc-vs-pride-mega-
events. 
32 Kaz Nagatsuka, UFC Hopes to Shake Up Japan Fight Scene, THE JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 28, 
2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2012/02/28/sports/ufc-hopes-to-shake-up-japan-
fight-scene/#.WI0XTbHMyRs.  
33 UFC Purchases Strikeforce; UFC Boss Says Organizations to Operate Independently, 
MMA JUNKIE (Mar. 12, 2011, 10:30 PM), http://mmajunkie.com/2011/03/ufc-purchases-
strikeforce. 
34 Damon Martin, Ronda Rousey Officially Moving to the UFC; Strikeforce Will Fold After 
January Event, MMA WEEKLY (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.mmaweekly.com/ronda-
rousey-officially-moving-to-the-ufc-strikeforce-will-fold-after-january-event. 
35 Id. 
36 Jon Wertheim, The Unbreakable Ronda Rousey is the World’s Most  Dominant Athlete, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED  (May 12, 2015), https://www.si.com/mma/2015/05/12/ronda-rousey-
ufc-mma-fighter-armbar. 
37 Complaint, Le v. Zuffa, LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Nev. 2016). 
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and lowering costs for consumers.38 Antitrust regulations, such as the 
Sherman Act, exist to ensure competition continues in the US economy.39 
Monopolies are believed to suppress competition and restrain trade, thus are 
prohibited by Section 2 of The Sherman Act.40 The UFC is being accused of 
having such a monopoly.41  
The UFC is not the first sports entity to come under the scrutiny of 
antitrust litigation.42  Sports have a long history of antitrust disputes.43 
Baseball holds the unique position of being exempt from antitrust laws.44 
Other professional sports leagues have hashed out their disputes through 
collective bargaining and litigation.45 Sports leagues are basically joint 
ventures of teams agreeing to work together for the sake of competition to 
entertain fans.46 Anytime there are large numbers of individuals working 
collectively, there is substantial potential for antitrust allegations.47 The 
essential collusion of athletes, teams and leagues, as well as production and 
distribution channels, are all to be balanced with healthy competition.48  
The antitrust lawsuit pending against the UFC alleges a Section 2 
violation of the Sherman Act which prohibits monopolies or attempts to 
monopolize any parts of trade or commerce.49  The violation contains two 
conjunctive elements.50 First, the entity has to acquire a monopoly and 
second, there must be the requisite intent to achieve and maintain that 
monopoly power.51 Achievements in enterprise leading to possible 
monopolies should not be stifled as long as the successes were achieved 
legally and do not result in a restraint of trade and competition. In other 
words, monopolies that occur due to the company’s natural innovations and 
expansion resulting from creating a superior product are permitted.52  The 
                                                 
38 Antitrust and Labor Law Issues in Sports, US LEGAL, 
https://sportslaw.uslegal.com/antitrust-and-labor-law-issues-in-sports/ (last visited Nov. 17, 
2017). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41Jon Barr, Fighters Claim UFC Restricts Earnings, ESPN (Dec. 16, 2014), 
http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/12037883/antitrust-lawsuit-filed-ufc-parent-
company-claims-monopoly. 
42 See generally Antitrust and Labor Law Issues in Sports, supra note 39. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 SPORTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 15 U.S.C. §2. 
50 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1996). 
51 Id. 
52 Id.; see also Antitrust and Labor Law Issues in Sports, supra note 38. 
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second element of intent is often the most challenging for plaintiffs to prove, 
but courts have determined if the motivation is something more than 
competition on its merits, it may be a violation.53  Once a plaintiff can 
establish the first two elements, he must still prove the antitrust violation 
caused injury to competition and specifically to the plaintiff.54  To fend off 
the allegations, defendants must prove their actions were actually 
procompetitive or for legitimate business purposes.55  The court then  
determines whether the defendant’s actions unfairly destroy competition 
itself or just are aggressive tactics for profit.56 Often judges engage in a 
balancing test of the procompetitive versus the anticompetitive effects of the 
alleged monopoly.57  
Applying these elements directly to the antitrust lawsuit against the UFC; 
the fighters must show the UFC has monopoly power of the MMA market 
and that the company intentionally acquired that monopoly by engaging in a 
strategy to destroy competition. Once the fighters prove those two things, 
then they must show that the UFC’s strategy and monopoly caused the 
fighters’ financial injury. To defend against these allegations, the UFC could 
try to say they do not have a monopoly but the better strategy is to claim the 
market dominance is the result of a better product and the concentration of 
talent is best for the sport. The following sections will assess the merits of the 
alleged antitrust practices committed by the UFC beginning with Part (i) in 
broadcasting, then Part (ii) with venues, and finally in Part (iii) with the talent.  
A.  Anticompetitive Strategy in Broadcasting 
The UFC is accused of engaging in unfair practices by forcing 
broadcasting companies into exclusive deals in a strategy to restrict 
competing promotions’ ability to reach consumers.58 Broadcasting is often a 
highly competitive market for sports leagues.59 The more promotions can get 
their product on the air, the more consumers can enjoy the sport.60 This in 
turn incentivizes sponsors to pay more, creating more revenue for the leagues, 
teams, players, etc. and, ultimately, an even better product61 
                                                 
53 Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602–04 (1985). 
54 SPORTS AND ANTITRUST LAW at 46. 
55 Major League Baseball Props, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 317 (2d Cir. 2008).  
56 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993). 
57 Id. 
58  Le v. Zuffa, LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1161 (D. Nev. 2016). 
59 Id. 
60 See Anthony Crupi, Sports Now Accounts for 37% of Broadcast TV Ad Spending, ADAGE 
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://adage.com/article/media/sports-account-37-percent-all-tv-ad-
dollars/300310/. 
61 Id. 
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A similar dispute of broadcasting rights and an alleged restraint of trade 
can be found in  the case of United States Football League v. National 
Football League.62 There the United States Football League (“UFSL”) 
alleged that the NFL had obtained a monopoly power over television rights 
in violation of the Sherman Act.63  The USFL claimed that because the NFL 
had exclusive deals with the principal television networks, it had essentially 
blocked out the USFL, not giving the league the ability to compete.64 The 
court found in favor of NFL, stating the existence of NFL contracts with three 
networks was not sufficient to claim an antitrust violation.65  The court also 
noted the failure of the USFL was due to its own deficient business dealings.66 
Despite this favorable ruling, the legislature would later carve out an antitrust 
exception for the professional football with the Sports Broadcasting Act67 to 
allow for greater collusion amongst franchises without fear of violation 
antitrust regulation.68  
In considering the UFC, the promotion only broadcasts on Fox Networks 
and on PPV as well as streaming on its own UFC’s Fight Pass online.69 
Furthermore UFC’s top competitor, Bellator, is owned by Viacom.70 Viacom 
is recognized as the fourth largest media conglomerate in the world.71 In 
today’s abundance of available broadcasting avenues, from the internet to 
cable and the existence of legitimate competition with Bellator, the assertion 
of a UFC monopoly in broadcasting is weak. 
                                                 
62 United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir 
1988). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1354–55. 
66 Id. at 1350. 
67 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295. 
68 Jack Moore, Throwback Thursday:  The TV Deal that Created Modern Sports, VICE 
SPORTS, (June 11, 2015, 2:38 PM), https://sports.vice.com/en_ca/article/throwback-
thursday-the-tv-deal-that-created-modern-sports.  
69 Jed Meshew, Morning Report:  UFC Looking to Quadruple its TV Broadcasting Deal 
Up to $450 Million Dollars, MMA FIGHTING (Nov. 29, 2016, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.mmafighting.com/2016/11/29/13773374/morning-report-ufc-looking-to-
quadruple-its-tv-broadcasting-deal-up. 
70 Kale Havervold, Three of the Biggest Competitors of the UFC, THE HISTORY LOCKER, 
http://historylocker.com/three-of-the-biggest-competitors-to-the-ufc/ (last visited Nov. 17, 
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71 Adam Guillen Jr., UFC Quick Quote:  Bellator and its $5 Billion Owner, Viacom can 
Afford to Pay Eddie Alvarez, SB NATION:  MMA MANIA, (Jan. 25, 2013, 12:19 PM) 
http://www.mmamania.com/2013/1/25/3914504/bellator-5-billion-viacom-ufc-pay-eddie-
alvarez-mma. 
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B.  Anticompetitive Strategy in Venues 
The complaint also alleges the UFC has obtained and maintained its 
monopoly power through exclusive contracts with venues.72 For the plaintiff 
to have a successful claim under this theory of a Sherman Act violation, he 
must show first, the defendant’s control over an essential facility; second, that 
the plaintiff cannot reasonably duplicate the facility; third, the rejection of 
use of the facility and, finally, the ability by the plaintiff to use said facility.73  
Similar allegations were made in Hetch v. Pro-Football, Inc.,74  where 
promoters sought to bring a team from the American Football League to the 
stadium where the Washington Redskins home games were played.75 The 
contract between the NFL and RFK Stadium excluded any other professional 
football team from using the site.76  The court held “where facilities cannot 
practicably be duplicated by would-be competitors, those in possession of 
them must allow them to be shared on fair terms. It was considered an illegal 
restraint on trade to foreclose on the scarce facility.”77 
This case can hardly foreclose on the UFC’s exclusive venue agreements 
due to the unparalleled nature of the venues. The capacity necessary for a 
MMA promotion is far less than for NFL games. NFL stadiums average a 
capacity upwards of 69,00078 whereas the UFC’s arenas are sub 20,000.79  
The average attendance at UFC Pay Per View events are between 10,000 and 
20,00080 people, whereas NFL games’ average attendance is 68,400.81  
Professional football teams would have a much more difficult time finding 
equivalent venues and MMA promotions do not have the same fortuitous 
obstacle.  
                                                 
72 Complaint, Le, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1154. 
73 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983). 
74 Hetch v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
75 Hetch, 570 F.2d at 982. 
76 Id. at 985. 
77 Id. at 992. 
78 Chris Chase, Ranking the Best and Worst NFL Stadiums, from No. 1 (Lambeau) to 31 
(Soldier), USA TODAY SPORTS (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:55 PM), 
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/10/best-worst-nfl-stadiums-capacity-rankings-lambeau-field-
solder-field-size-super-bowls. 
79 Total Attendance, TAPOLOGY, http://www.tapology.com/search/mma-event-figures/total-
attendance (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
80 Id. 
81 NFL Sees Small Regular-Season Attendance Decline; Titans, Rams Down Sharply at 
Home, SPORTS BUSINESS DAILY GLOBAL JOURNAL, (January 5, 2016), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2016/01/05/Research-and-Ratings/NFL-
gate.aspx. 
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C.  Anticompetitive Strategy in Talent 
The primary source of the alleged grievances in the antitrust complaint 
against the UFC is the treatment of its athletes, specifically fighter pay. 
Though the complaint alleges antitrust violations injured competing 
promotion companies, the plaintiffs who brought the suit were not those 
failed promotion companies but ex UFC fighters.82 They complain the UFC 
signed its fighters to one-sided, long term contracts to keep the them from 
competing in other leagues.83 According to the fighters, if the UFC has all of 
the talent and the UFC refuses to work with other leagues, those leagues will 
undoubtedly fail.84 This result creates a monopoly for the UFC so it can stifle 
competition and fighter pay.85 Refusing to work with competitors is not an 
antitrust violation, but it can be.86  The Supreme Court noted that “we have 
been very cautious in recognizing such exceptions, because of the uncertain 
virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying 
anticompetitive conduct by a single firm.”87 The Court here acknowledged 
competing enterprises can refuse to work together in order to starve out its 
competitors. 
This general notion that monopolists do not have to engage in business 
with would be competitors has been upheld numerous times in the courts, 
notably in Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc.88  Here the 
Professional Golfers’ Association of America (“PGA”) required journalists 
to delay publishing tournament scores.89 A media company wanted to use 
those scores to generate more viewers and therefore additional revenue. 
However, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the unfair practice claim against the 
PGA.90  Instead, it held that, as long as the actions were for legitimate 
business purposes and not to restrain trade, the media company was not able 
to freeride off the PGA’s effort to compile, produce and release their product 
as they saw fit.91  
When the UFC signs fighters to long term deals, it would be difficult to 
say that the UFC’s intent was to eliminate competing promotions and not for 
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its own procompetitive reasons. The UFC has many legitimate motives to 
sign all the talent to long-term contracts. For one, having all the best fighters 
under a single promotion allows that promotion to set those fighters against 
each other, without the difficulty of having two promotion companies work 
together. This was the issue causing the delay for the Mayweather-Pacquiao 
fight. Floyd Mayweather and Manny Pacquiao reigned as co-champions for 
nearly a decade before finally stepping in the ring as foes.92  The bout was 
highly anticipated by fans wanting to see the two best boxers compete, but 
due to promotional disputes the fight came years too late.93   
Another procompetitive incentive for the UFC to have fighters in long-
term deals, is the ability to feel more comfortable making large monetary 
investments in promotion and marketing to build stars, such as Connor 
McGregor and Rhonda Rousey.94 Because of those stars, the UFC has been 
able to expand further into the mainstream markets, thus creating more 
revenue for the UFC and presumptively its fighters.95 If the UFC can prove 
the procompetitive nature of locking their fighters into contracts, where they 
were not able to compete in other leagues, they should be free from liability 
for antitrust violations.96   
The UFC used several clauses to control their stable of fighters, most 
notably the “retirement clause,” the “champions clause” and the “ancillary 
rights clause.”  
                                                 
92 See Martin Rogers, Mayweather-Pacquiao Happening, but Fighters Years Past Primes, 
USA TODAY (Feb 21, 2015, 7:19 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2015/02/21/mayweather-pacquiao-boxing-vegas-
mgm-grand-past-primes/23814065/ (Discussions of the Floyd Mayweather versus Manny 
Pacquiao match began in 2009 but it would take six years before the two would face each 
other in 2015 due to promotional disputes between the two). 
93 Id. 
94 See Patrick Wyman, How the Ufc Made Ronda Rousey and Conor Mcgregor Stars, 
BLEACHER REPORT (Nov. 12, 2015), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2587824-how-the-
ufc-made-ronda-rousey-and-conor-mcgregor-stars (Conor McGregor and Rhonda Rousey 
eclipsed the sport of MMA. Both athletes’ popularity grew beyond the UFC; being featured 
in movies and fashion magazines); see also Alastair Campbell, Conor McGregor: ‘I’m 
Going for Multi-Multi-Millions,’ GQ MAGAZINE (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.gq-
magazine.co.uk/article/conor-mcgregor-interview; Ronda Rousey Joins the Lifetime 
Network with Three Movie Deal, FOX SPORTS (Apr. 27, 2016, 1:20 PM), 
http://www.foxsports.com/ufc/story/ufc-ronda-rousey-joins-the-lifetime-network-with-
three-movie-deal-042716.  
95 Wyman, supra note 94; see also Campbell, supra note 94; Matt Fitzgerald, Ronda 
Rousey's Triumph in 1st Female Main Event Expands Ufc's Audience, BLEACHER REPORT 
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1548074-ronda-rouseys-triumph-in-first-
female-main-event-expands-ufcs-audience; Ronda Rousey Joins the Lifetime Network with 
Three Movie Deal, supra note 94. 
96 See Antitrust Labor Law Issues in Sports, supra note 38.  
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The retirement clause states: 
“If at any time during the Term, Fighter decides to retire from mixed 
martial arts or other professional fighting competition," the clause 
begins, "then ZUFFA may, at its election, (i) suspend the Term for the 
period of such retirement; (ii) declare that ZUFFA has satisfied its 
obligation to promote all future Bouts to be promoted by ZUFFA 
hereunder, without any compensation due to Fighter therefore; or (iii) 
elect to provide Fighter with notice of an Acceleration.”97 
This clause gives the UFC three options in its contractual obligations to 
athletes when the athlete retires.98 Clause (i) allows the UFC to suspend the 
contract, owning the rights to the fighter in perpetuity.99 Therefore, should 
the fighter come out of retirement, he cannot just go join another league. 
Clause (ii) allows the UFC to consider fights offered while in retirement as 
satisfying their contractual obligations. 100 And clause (iii) gives the UFC the 
ability to accelerate and end the contract, therefore releasing the UFC and the 
fighter from any obligation.101  
The champions clause states: 
“If, at the expiration of the Term, Fighter is then a UFC champion, the 
Term shall automatically be extended for the period commencing on 
the Termination Date and ending on the later of (i) one (1) year from 
the Termination Date; or (ii) the date on which Fighter has participated 
in three (3) bouts promoted by ZUFFA, regardless of weight class or 
title, following the Termination Date ("Extension Term").”102 
This clause gives the UFC the power to extend an athlete’s contract for 
one year after winning a championship or for three more fights, whichever 
comes first. It is not apparent what happens if the champion keeps winning.103 
At least one commentator has even suggested a possible 13th Amendment 
violation, comparing it to involuntary servitude.104 Allowing the UFC to 
control a fighter after he becomes champion; advantages the promotion and 
fans for the following reasons.  
First, the fighter will not be able to bring his championship status and 
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fame to another league.105 This incentivizes the UFC to build more 
promotional value behind that specific fighter, without fear of losing out on 
its investment. Secondly, if the UFC cannot control the champion, not only 
would this monetarily dissuade the UFC from building stars, it would 
complicate divisions with vacant titles and substitute champions. Each 
division must have a champion and if one leaves, then the contending athletes 
cannot compete to become the “true champion.” Situations like this occur 
when a fighter moves up in weight or cannot defend his title due to injury and 
retains champion status, while other compete to become interim 
champions.106 Too many champions leads to confusion for fans and dilutes 
the glory of being a champion. Similar effects have already occurred in 
boxing, caused by multiple governing bodies awarding numerous 
championship belts and causing decline in viewership.107 
Finally, the Ancillary Rights Clause grants the UFC the exclusive rights 
to the athlete’s identity as a UFC fighter. The UFC would argue that the 
promotion makes the fighters into an entity, a character so to speak, which 
the UFC in turn would like to profit from and it alone. It makes sense to not 
want to put massive amounts of money behind a fighter, building up his 
brand, only to have him then go to a competing league and use all the fame 
to drive the successes of other leagues. The UFC’s general counsel Lawrence 
Epstein stated the following in the defense of this clause, “We're trying to 
capture the rights that can emanate from the fighter's participation in our 
event. The video that we capture of the pre-event, the post-event, the event 
itself—we want to be able to exploit that in any way we possibly can. At the 
end of the day, that's the only real asset that the UFC has.”108   
                                                 
105 Snowden, supra note 5. 
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i. Hollywood’s Control Over Talent During the Golden Era 
Hollywood studios made a similar argument during Hollywood’s Golden 
Era in which the studios practiced the same control over their talent to 
generate more revenue.109 In the 1930’s and 40’s the entire film industry was 
run by the five major studios.110 The actors themselves were controlled under 
the contract system, where they were compelled into long term contracts, 
(usually seven years) at the very beginning of their careers, prior to knowing 
their worth.111 The contracts could and would be extended for numerous 
reasons, such as when the actors turned down a role if they felt it 
inappropriate for their skill level.112 Even if the actors were unable to work 
for a period of time due to illness, the contract could be extended.113 The 
actors were not allowed to work with other studios while under contract, if 
they thought they could possibly make more money or they preferred a 
particular role. 114 The actors could be loaned out to competing studios, but 
the actors would receive no additional compensation and were not at liberty 
to refuse.115 If the actor protested, the actor’s contract would be suspended 
without pay, until agreeing to work again.116 
Hollywood’s chokehold on its talent inevitably came to end with De 
Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures.117 In this case, the studio exercised a 
number of the previously mentioned unsavory practices, such as loaning the 
actress to other studios, under using her talent, and suspending and extending 
her contract.118  On the advice of her agent and lawyer, she filed suit and, 
surprising many, she won.119  As a result of this decision, actors and actress 
were able to work freely at any studio that suited them, whether that be for 
monetary reasons or for preferred roles.120  This case would seem to be 
favorable to the athletes bringing suit against the UFC. The fighters believe 
that if they could move freely amongst leagues their value would increase. 
Sadly, their theory is flawed.  
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IV. ANTITRUST IN THE UFC IS DISTINCT FROM OTHER SPORTS AND 
INDUSTRIES AND FOR GOOD REASON   
The analogy previously presented of the UFC being to MMA, what the 
NFL is to football is not perfect because the NFL consists of teams of players, 
and the UFC consists of individual athletes. This distinction is an important 
one because one of the most litigated areas of antitrust issues in sports is the 
non-statutory labor exemption.121 It is Congress’s intention that judicial 
intervention not be the immediate resolution for all labor disputes.122 It is the 
preferred federal labor policy that such disputes be resolved through 
collective bargaining and economic pressures.123  Leagues such as the 
National Football League, Major League Baseball, National Basketball 
Association, and the National Hockey League all have player unions that 
lobby for the interests of the athletes. The judiciary will do its best to avoid 
interfering with deals created between players’ unions and their leagues, but 
it does happen.124 Attempts to unionize fighters have been under way for 
years but have failed to materialize.125 The UFC’s president, Dana White, 
mocked the unions for battling amongst each themselves126 and called into 
question the unions’ leadership and motivations in creating such unions. 127 
He is quoted saying, “as a fighter there’s a lot of people that are trying to put 
their hand in your pocket. Be careful whose hand you let go in your 
pocket.”128 Nevertheless, because fighters currently have no legitimate union, 
it is not necessary to examine the non-statutory labor exemption when it 
comes to the UFC and MMA.129 
Since the collective bargaining examination does not apply, because the 
UFC consists of nonunion individual athletes and the league does not consist 
of teams, a more appropriate comparison again comes from Hollywood. 
During the same period of the aforementioned contract system, those same 
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studios were exercising monopoly power over the entire industry.130 The 
“block-booking” tactic was the greatest source of controversy practiced by 
the monopolist studios.131  “Block-booking,” was the studio refusing to sell a 
movie individually to a theater, but rather would require the theater to 
purchase a block of movies.132  This was advantageous to the studios because 
it allowed for one good movie to carry the profits for the rest of films in the 
block.133  
These major studios felt the pressures of the new Franklin D. Roosevelt 
administration and knew their monopoly power and predatory practices 
would be short lived.134  The film industry made the same monetary pleas as 
the UFC’s Lawrence Epstein did above, stating their practices were essential 
and the business would not be economically viable without them.135  But in 
1945 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought suit against the studios for 
violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.136  The suit reached the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures137 and ruled in favor of the 
DOJ, citing the many ways in which the studios violated antitrust laws.138  
The block-booking maneuver was key to the government’s argument. The 
Court determined a film should be judged on its own merits, and the practice 
would suppress the quality of films and entertainment as a whole.139   
In De Haviland, the actors and actresses wanted to be free to work with 
competing studios.140 In Paramount, the DOJ was dissatisfied with studios 
working collectively; suppressing the quality of films.141 Because of the 
decisions in Paramount and De Haviland, the major studios were stripped of 
much of their power and many independent producers emerged.142 These 
cases are useful in considering the alleged antitrust violations of the UFC and 
the results that may come if the lawsuit is successful.   
Should the UFC lose the antitrust lawsuit, the consequences for fighters 
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would differ from Hollywood’s talent. MMA athletes want to compete in the 
UFC and if they are a good MMA fighter, “it’s the UFC or nothing.”143 All 
the premier athletes fight in the UFC, so there is no issue of quality and it is 
the only league an athlete can hope to make substantial income.144 Divesting 
the UFC of their concentrated control would damage the product. In boxing, 
the power is vastly splintered with numerous regulatory bodies creating 
dozens of championship belts in each weight class, frustrating even the most 
loyal fan.145 Boxing’s numerous promoters also add to the vexation. The stale 
Mayweather-Pacquiao fight situation146 would never occur in the UFC 
because the UFC is responsive to what fans want.147 These promotional 
battles plague boxing.148 The UFC holds a great advantage in having absolute 
control over all the athletes and promotional aspects. The UFC can make the 
fights fans want. Should the antitrust lawsuit succeed, the UFC’s absolute 
authority would no longer exist. Competing athletes of the UFC desire more 
money, they want a bigger percentage of the league’s income, but they must 
realize that the athletes’ income is tied to the successes of the only legitimate 
MMA league, the UFC. 
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN THE MUHAMMAD ALI EXPANSION ACT 
The Muhammad Ali Expansion Act149 is another proposed solution to 
many of the athletes’ grievances.150 H.R. 5365 was introduced into the house 
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in March of 2016.151  The legislation would take protections afforded to 
boxers and expand them to many other combat sports, including MMA.152 
For athletes the greatest contention to expand the bill are the financial 
protections the regulation is meant to provide. 153  It is helpful to evaluate the 
effects of the legislation on boxers and how it failed to accomplish its goals. 
By doing this, it gives insight of how it will fail to protect MMA athletes as 
they hope. The following sections will discuss the pertinent provisions of the 
proposed bill.  
A.  Coercive Contract Provision 
Section 6307(b) of the Muhammad Ali Act protects fighters against 
coercive contracts by making them unenforceable.154 Coercive contracts are 
of course already unenforceable under common law. The legislation goes on 
to define the coercive contracts provisions often used to take advantage of 
boxers in order to make them readily identifiable. A coercive contract is 
described in this section as a contract that grants a boxer’s rights to a promoter 
when that boxer is either already under contract to another promoter or grants 
those rights to the promoter for longer than 12 months. If the granting of those 
rights is a condition precedent to the participation in a professional boxing 
match, it will be considered coercive.155 
This section of the legislation emerged in response to a situation that arose 
in the mid-nineties involving Mike Tyson, Evander Holyfield, and Don 
King.156 Then heavyweight champion Mike Tyson was promoted by Don 
King and Holyfield wished to challenge Mike Tyson for the belt.157  In order 
for Holyfield to be granted the fight, he was forced to sign with Don King as 
his promoter even though he already had one.158 This arrangement would be 
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unenforceable under the Muhammad Ali Act.159 
The following examples prove how the coercive contract clause has been 
substantially legally ineffectual in boxing. The first example presents how 
courts ignore clear violations of the law. The second exposes the lack of 
redressability a court can provide, when there is a clear violation due the 
monetary and time limitations of fighters. 
In Lewis v Rahman160, Hussein Rahman, a then-contender who had 
suffered recent losses,161 signed to fight the heavyweight champion, Lennox 
Lewis.162 Rahman was forced to sign a provision requiring him to fight in a 
rematch under Lewis’s promoter should the champion, Lewis, lose their first 
bout.163  The deal also required that if Rahman chose to fight prior to their 
rematch and lost, the opponent would be under Lewis’s promoter as well.164  
Not surprisingly, however, when Rahman pulled off the upset win, he was 
not eager for the rematch and instead wanted to fight an interim bout against 
another opponent.165  Lewis demanded an immediate rematch and sued for 
injunctive relief and breach of contract.166 Rahman challenged the 
enforceability of the contract, citing the provisions above as violations under 
the Muhammad Ali Act167 prohibiting coercive contracts.168  The court, 
persuaded by the aging fallen champ and his endearing pleas to recover his 
title before retirement, ruled in favor of Lewis, ignoring the violations.169  
The other example revealing the ineffectiveness of the prohibited 
coercive contract provision occurred when Bermane Stiverne sued Don 
King.170  Stiverne had recently beaten Ray Austin in the World Boxing 
Council’s (“WBC”) title eliminator to become the number one contender. 171 
Ray Austin was under Don King’s promotion.172 Prior to fighting Austin, 
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Stiverne was forced to sign an exclusive promotion agreement with King.173  
After beating Austin, Stiverne wanted to fight Vitali Klitschko for the 
heavyweight title and foresaw King’s interference with the deal.174 Stiverne 
sued, claiming he had been coerced into an exclusionary contract with Don 
King Promotions.175 He sought a preliminary injunction.176 Don King fired 
back with numerous claims against Stiverne and his manager, including 
breach of contract and tortious inference.177 Stiverne’s request for a 
preliminary injunction was denied and subsequently he dismissed his case.178  
This is an all-too common story; fighters have neither the time nor the 
money to battle drawn out litigation when their careers are so short lived.  In 
contrast, the pockets of promoters are often much deeper, their time frame 
much longer, and they are generally more powerful.179 If the regulations were 
to be expanded to MMA, the promoters would still be able to draft contracts 
with these provisions and continue to require fighters sign them. Promoters 
might not be able to enforce them in the unlikely event the fighter can afford 
both the time and money to sue. This is likely a gamble many promoters 
would take. In other words, unless and until courts invalidate these 
provisions, unscrupulous promoters can continue to try to take advantage of 
fighters. Absent a proper interpretation and enforcement, such provisions are 
no protection. 
In the event the legislation is expanded and properly enforced this 
provision would greatly affect MMA, specifically the UFC. Anytime fighters 
were nearing the end of their contracts and wanted to sign for another fight, 
the UFC would not be able to enforce a new contract for greater than 12 
months, should it be signed as a condition precedent to that fight happening. 
The aforementioned championship and retirement clauses would be limited 
by this provision as well. This provision of the proposed regulation would be 
beneficial to the high-profile athletes because it allows them to renegotiate 
more regularly and, in theory, increase their market share.180  On the other 
hand, it may hurt the fighters just starting out who would prefer long-term 
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deals.181 This is especially true in an industry rife with injuries causing 
extended periods of inactivity.182   
B.  Manager Promoter Firewall Provision 
Section eight of the Muhammad Ali Act provides for a firewall between 
managers and promoters for specific types of fighters.183 It makes it illegal 
for a promoter to have any financial interest in the management of a boxer or 
for a manager to have any financial interests in the promotion of a boxer. The 
provision’s application is limited to boxers fighting ten rounds or more.184 
The purpose of this provision was to make sure a fighter’s manager and 
promoter are working independently for the benefit of the fighter and avoid 
any self-dealing.  
This provision has also, for the most part, been toothless in boxing. Alan 
Haymon, one of boxing most prominent managers,185 emerged on the boxing 
scene in 2015 with a new promotion company, Premier Boxing 
Championship (‘PBC’).186 PBC is technically not Haymon’s promotion, as 
he is not a promoter but a manager, and that would no doubt be a violation of 
the Muhammad Ali Act.187 Nonetheless, PBC is owned by Haymon Sports, 
LLC.188 Haymon manages over 200 fighters, most if not all who also fight on 
PBC promotions, but Haymon claims he is nothing more than an advisor for 
PBC.189 Most anyone can see through this thinly veiled attempt to skirt the 
Muhammad Ali Act, but when sued for using “sham promoters” he has so far 
been untouchable.190 
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Another defect of this provision is that it only applies to fighters fighting 
ten rounds or more.191 Boxing matches can range from four to twelve 
rounds.192 Four rounders will be for the novice fighters just entering 
professional boxing while the twelve rounders are reserved for championship 
bouts.193  The limited application means it does not protect the most 
vulnerable fighters. Those who are involved in bouts of 10 rounds or more, 
are probably well established and, thus, in a better position to protect 
themselves.194  
The legislation is altered in its application to MMA as to include all 
fighters. MMA bouts are usually three five-minute rounds, unless it is a 
championship, which are five five-minute rounds.195 The proposed 
legislation would apply to “mixed martial arts competition or other combat 
sport competition scheduled for 11 minutes or more.”196 This will apply the 
firewall provision to all MMA fighters, promoters, and managers. Ignore the 
implications for the UFC if any, because UFC does not manage fighters, they 
promote MMA events.197 Though it could be argued the UFC controls 
fighters similar to managers.198  
The greatest impact may be felt by local MMA promotions.199 Most 
MMA fighters do not start in the UFC; they start by fighting at local and 
regional events. Very often the promoter of those local shows also owns a 
gym, whose fighters will typically fill the card of the promoter’s show.200 The 
promoter’s job is to sell tickets. Promoters do this by getting local fighters on 
the fight card. Local fighters are better able to sell tickets, by bringing family 
and friends. Often that promoter is also a gym owner and will act as a 
manager for those same unaccomplished fighters.201 This provision would 
prohibit this structure, causing local and small promotions to dwindle into 
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extinction.202 This will significantly weaken the talent base of MMA athletes 
for the UFC to scout from, adversely affecting the sport.203  
C.  Financial Disclosure Provision 
The Muhammad Ali Act also contains a financial disclosure provision 
which states that the promoter shall not receive any compensation until he 
provides the fighter with 
“(1) the amounts of any compensation or consideration that a 
promoter has contracted to receive from such match; (2) all fees, 
charges, and expenses that will be assessed by or through the promoter 
on the boxer pertaining to the event, including any portion of the 
boxer’s purse that the promoter will receive, and training expenses; 
and (3) any reduction in a boxer’s purse contrary to a previous 
agreement between the promoter and the boxer or a purse bid held for 
the event.”204 
This provision has been the subject of much litigation in boxing. For 
instance, gold medalist Olympian and current light heavyweight champion, 
Andre Ward, brought suit against his promoter in 2014 for such a violation.205  
The lawsuit was preceded by two arbitration disputes between fighter and 
promoter, both decided in favor of the promoter.206  Presumably because 
Ward was unhappy with the arbitration results, he sued and was eventually 
released to fight with another promoter.207  Whether this violation was the 
source of Ward’s grievance or just something he could use against the 
promoter to get out of his promotion deal, he ended up all but falling out of 
the ranks, fighting only three times in thirty-six months due to the dispute.208  
The time and expense of litigation make these solutions impractical to most 
fighters.209  
Not only are the legal avenues of resolution impractical for fighters, the 
actual logistics of disclosing the financials to fighters can be an unworkable 
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task for a promoter. Promoters make a great deal of their income from pay 
per view and ticket sales at the gate, and it can take months to determine these 
numbers.210 The promoter may also have long term deals with foreign 
broadcasters and exclusive venue deals that pay out over set periods of 
time.211 Calculating the amount attributable to a specific fighter is a 
perplexing task. Furthermore, the regulation requires the promoter disclose 
the gross amount of revenue and not the net, giving a misleading value to 
fighters.212   
One purpose of the financial disclosure provision is to assist boxers assess 
their market value. Unfortunately for the fighters, the disclosure provision 
lacks a time for which the disclosure must be made.213  Due to this inept 
drafting, the purpose to assist fighters is frustrated.  This was the source of a 
dispute with professional boxer Chris Algieri.214 Algieri had unexpected 
successes in two major upset victories in a row after a less than stellar start 
to his career.215  Using the momentum of those wins, Algieri signed to fight 
Manny Pacquiao for his highest pay day at $1.67 million.216 He lost that fight 
against Pacquiao and then went on to lose again, and then sneak in a win 
before setting a fight with Olympian Errol Spence, Jr.217 Algieri demanded 
the disclosures prior to the fight with Spence but the promoter refused, which 
he could do as the Act is silent on when the disclosure must be made, putting 
the fighter at a great disadvantage.218  In fact, it is common for a promoter to 
make disclosures at the last minute, giving the fighter little opportunity to 
renegotiate prior to his or her bout. 219 This is a strategy used by promoters to 
eliminate the chance the fighter will demand more money, and there is 
nothing illegal about this underhanded method of disclosure.220 
The required disclosure provision serves several purposes; the one which 
athletes are most interested in concerns their market value.221  The provision 
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provides more transparency, usually considered a good thing. Fighters see 
how much money their names bring to the promotion so, in theory, they 
should have a better idea of their worth and in return they can demand an 
appropriate amount money.222 As much as the disclosure provision provides 
essential information, the method of delivery required and recourse for 
fighters if its deviated, prove it is both inadequate and impractical. 
D.  Independent Ranking Requirement Provision 
The Muhammad Ali Act requires that there be an independent ranking 
system.223 In boxing, the governing sanctioning bodies are required to report 
justifications for the rank of fighters.224 The rankings often determine who 
fights who, due to mandatory challenger provisions in boxing. Because 
fighter rankings are subject to discretion and often do not adhere to objective 
determinations, they are easily manipulated by persuasion, especially the 
financial kind.225 The Muhammad Ali Act has not been successful in 
eradicating boxing of this sort of corruption226   
In the UFC, the UFC itself controls the ranking system and has shown it 
is willing to arbitrarily lower fighters’ rank as a form of punishment.227 Jon 
Fitch is said to be an example of this mistreatment.228 After winning fifteen 
straight fights, Fitch fought for the title and lost.229 Soon thereafter, Fitch 
battled with the UFC over a video game deal that lead to his contract being 
terminated.230 Although they finally agreed to a deal and he was reinstated in 
the UFC,231 he only won the battle, but lost the war as he was subsequently 
forced to fight on undercards, a practice generally reserved for the less 
achieved fighters.232  
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The UFC does attempt at an independent ranking system, though its 
merely for show. The organization uses media members to vote on the 
fighters’ ranks.233 Determining who is the better fighter is a daunting task in 
considering all the variables of a fighter’s skills. The rankings are highly 
subjective and often produce perplexing results where fighters will be 
outranked by a fighter they had previously defeated.234 Furthermore the 
rankings mean nothing more than bragging rights for fighters or to assist fans 
in following along. In the UFC, there is no such thing as a mandatory 
challenger. The rankings in the UFC have little effect on who fights who, as 
that is in the discretion of the UFC, who will put on the fight that fans most 
want to see.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The fighters are unhappy because they think they are not getting paid 
enough. The UFC enjoys the status quo and so prefers things stay the same. 
The fans, and they must be considered, are happy if they continue getting big 
fights. The fans are the ultimate consumer and those responsible for driving 
revenue for the UFC. They should be the main concern of not only the UFC, 
but of the fighters. This is what makes the lawsuit and the athlete’s support 
for the proposed regulation so perplexing. Both will undoubtedly hurt the 
UFC and in turn hurt the fans and inevitably the athletes.  
This is not to say the UFC is perfect and should be left alone. There is 
debate over what percentage of the UFC’s revenue is going to the fighter.235  
Some claim it is as low as seven percent, others say it is as high as thirty five 
percent.236 Boxing promoter Bob Arum claims in boxing, the percentage 
going to the fighter can be as high as eighty percent.237 Maybe none of those 
percentages are reasonable for either the UFC or the fighters,238 but they must 
                                                 
233 UFC Fighter Rankings, UFC (Nov. 13, 2017), 
http://www.ufc.com/rankings?fb_comment_id=6086517324953#f1b838fe1352dfa. 
234 Tim Burke, The Official UFC Rankings aren't Perfect, and Here's Why, SB NATION:  
BLOODY ELBOW (Oct. 29, 2013 2:00 PM), 
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2013/10/29/5042538/ufc-rankings-issues-nelson-machida. 
235 Anton Tabuena, Do UFC Fighters Get Just 7% of the Pie? Anik and Schaub Debate 
Salary, Revenue Share, SB NATION:  BLOODY ELBOW (Aug 18, 2015, 7:31 AM), 
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2015/8/18/9170185/anik-schaub-debate-ufc-fighter-salary-
revenue-share; see Jesse Holland, Bob Arum Fires Back at Dana White: ‘UFC Fighters Get 
Paid Nothing, SB NATION:  MMA MANIA (Sept. 23, 2011, 9:51 AM), 
http://www.mmamania.com/2011/9/23/2444228/bob-arum-fires-back-at-dana-white-ufc-
fighters-get-paid-nothing. 
236 Tabuena, supra note 252. 
237 Holland, supra note 252. 
238 Brett Okamoto, UFC Fighters for Mix Martial Arts Athletes Association, ESPN (Nov. 
30, 2016), http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/18175184/ufc-fighters-come-together-
28 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. [VOL. 8:1 
 
find a happy medium.  
Fighter’s pay is not an antitrust issue and the Muhammad Ali Act does 
not address it. As it stands, the Muhammad Ali Act has proven ineffective. 
The legislation was not able to help the fighters in boxing as it was supposed 
to. It is ludicrous to expect the legislation to help the MMA athletes in its 
expanded version.  Even when it was first enacted, its own drafters felt the 
legislation was deficient.239  The MMA community, if it feels that regulation 
is necessary, should create its own rules, appropriate for the dynamics of the 
sport and not just lazily expand an already failing Muhammad Ali Act.  As 
for the antitrust suit, the fighters should assess the end game and what it is 
they want. Do they want to fight for other leagues? Probably not. But they 
want more money, so what is the best way to accomplish that goal? It is not 
to hurt the UFC brand, which they are a part of. In order to avoid further 
frustration for fighter, fan, and company, the UFC must be proactive in 
resolving these issues with their athletes, as they are the lifeblood of the sport. 
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